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Feature Article 
THE PROPOSED HAGES COUNCIL REFORMS: AN EVALUATION 
by John Gennard, Professor of Indus t r i a l Relations 
Peter McGregor, i Fraser of Allander I n s t i t u t e 
University of Strathclyde 
1. The development of wages councils 
The o r i g i n s of Wages Councils l i e in the 
Trade Board Act (1909) which provided for 
the r e g u l a t i o n of pay to p reven t the 
payment of wages below subsistence leve l . 
The Boards had power to f i x only minimum 
t i m e r a t e s and p i e c e w o r k r a t e s . 
Following the Whitely Committee Report in 
1919 the philosophy towards Trade Boards 
was extended. I t was hoped t h a t union 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n on the Boards would he lp 
the growth of unionisation in t h e i r areas 
such t h a t u l t i m a t e l y the Boards could be 
r e p l a c e d by v o l u n t a r y c o l l e c t i v e 
ba rga in ing a r rangements . In 1945 the 
Wages Councils Act changed the name of the 
Trade Boards to Wages Councils which were 
given wider powers than the Boards had in 
t h a t they could dea l wi th a l l a s p e c t s of 
pay and holidays. However, i t was hoped 
t h a t Councils would not only prevent 
'sweated t rades ' and encourage the growth 
of v o l u n t a r y c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g 
arrangements but would a l s o provide a 
ra tchet below which wages would not f a l l . 
I t was envisaged t h a t t h i s ' f l o o r ' of pay 
would help maintain employment l eve l s so 
tha t the immediate post second world war 
per iod would not see a r e p e a t of what 
happened af ter the end of the f i r s t world 
war, namely a short sharp boom followed by 
slump. 
When the Donovan Commission r e p o r t e d on 
the UK i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s system in 
1968, one of i t s conc lus ions was t h a t 
t r a d e u n i o n s were t o o weak i n Wages 
C o u n c i l s a r e a s of employment . I t 
proposed a number of measures designed to 
encourage the growth of u n i o n i s a t i o n in 
these and other areas of employment. I t 
p r o p o s e d t h a t Wages C o u n c i l s shou ld 
e v e n t u a l l y be r e p l a c e d by v o l u n t a r y 
co l l ec t ive bargaining arrangements and to 
g ive f u r t h e r encouragement t o t h i s sh i f t 
a d v o c a t e d t h a t t h e p r o c e d u r e s and 
c o n d i t i o n s for abo l i sh ing Wages Councils 
s h o u l d be r e l a x e d . The Employment 
P r o t e c t i o n Act (1975) provided for the 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t of S t a t u t o r y J o i n t 
I n d u s t r i a l Counci ls to ope ra t e wi thout 
independent members, the i n t e n t i o n being 
tha t they should provide a stepping stone 
on the way to the development of voluntary 
co l l ec t ive bargaining machinery. 
The present Government i s not the f i r s t to 
want to seek the demise of Wages Councils. 
However, i t s r e a s o n s f o r t h i s a r e 
different than previous governments. The 
p r e sen t Government wishes t o a b o l i s h or 
reform the Wages Council system as a means 
of f r e e i n g the labour market , w h i l s t 
p rev ious Governments have wished t o see 
them ended and rep laced by vo lun ta ry 
co l l ec t ive bargaining arrangements. 
2 . The ex tent and funct ions of Wages 
Councils 
There are a t present 26 Wages Councils in 
Great Br i ta in , covering about 2.75 mil l ion 
workers and nearly 400,000 establishments, 
p r i m a r i l y in s e r v i c e i n d u s t r i e s such as 
r e t a i l i n g , c a t e r i n g and h a i r d r e s s i n g . 
The number of employers affected by the i r 
operation i s 260,000. Overall, the Wages 
Council system es tabl i shes minimum ra tes 
for about 11% of the employed labour 
force. 
Wages Counci ls have two ' s i d e s ' normally 
appointed by employers ' a s s o c i a t i o n s and 
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unions and three 'independent' members 
appointed by the Secretary of State . The 
task of the independent members i s 
primarily to mediate and bring the sides 
to agreement. The Councils set legal ly 
enforceable minimum ra tes of pay and 
holidays, published in the form of wages 
orders. In March of t h i s year most 
minimum ra tes set by Wages Council for 
full-time adult employees ranged from £63 
to £72 per week. Ministers have no 
powers to veto or amend Wages Council's 
decisions. Enforcement of Wages Council 
o rders i s the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the 
Depa r tmen t of Employment ' s Wages 
Inspectorate which aims to check the pay 
of w o r k e r s a t one t e n t h of t h e 
establishments on i t s register each year. 
Evidence from inspection v is i t s indicates 
that the proportion of establishments 
found to be underpaying on wages orders i s 
re la t ive ly high. However, some argue 
that such figures cannot be taken as an 
i n d i c a t i o n of the o v e r a l l l eve l of 
compliance because visited establishments 
are not typical and where establishments 
are found to have underpaid only one or 
two workers are normally involved. 
Some, therefore, consider the proportion 
of workers found to be underpaid in a l l 
checks to be a more r e l i ab l e measure of 
the degree of compliance. The Department 
of Employment Consultative document on 
Wages Councils issued in 1985 reported 
that of the workers covered by checks by 
vis i ts and other methods in the past three 
years, only about 6% were found to be 
underpaid and tha t t h i s resulted from 
employers misunderstanding the provisions 
of the wages order. Where underpayments 
are found, the inspectors assess the 
amount of a r rears due. About 10,000 
complaints are received annually from 
workers covered by a Council order of 
which over one third involve enti t lement 
to accrued hol iday pay on leaving 
employment. The Inspectorate has powers 
to prosecute offending employers but these 
are rarely used. They prefer to secure 
compliance by advice and persuasion and 
the major i ty of employers appear to 
respond to this approach. 
3. The Government's proposals on Wages 
Councils 
In March 1985 the Government published a 
consultative paper on the future of Wages 
Councils (see Consultative Paper on Wages 
Council, Department of Employment, 1985) 
in which i t canvassed two main options: 
e i ther t o t a l abol i t ion or reform of the 
Wages Counc i l s y s t e m , i n c l u d i n g 
par t icu la r ly the l i m i t a t i o n of t h e i r 
powers and duties and the removal of young 
people from the scope of Wages Councils. 
In addition to canvassing these options 
the document s t a t e d t h a t s ince the 
Government's overriding concern was to 
maximise employment opportunities i t would 
have to consider deratifying International 
Labour Convention No 26. This Convention 
requires those countries which ratify i t -
and the UK has - to create or maintain 
minimum wage f ix ing machinery The 
convention also contains provision for 
de ra t i f i ca t ion . This can be considered 
at 5-yearly intervals but i t i s necessary 
to give 12 months notice and to consult 
representat ives of employers and trade 
unions. Obligations under the Convention 
cease 12 months after not i f ica t ion of 
deratification. 
Over 700 organisations and individuals 
responded to the consultative paper. The 
TUC and i n d i v i d u a l unions favoured 
r e t e n t i o n , but employers expressed 
widespread d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the 
present Wages Council system. However, 
the majority of them favoured a range of 
s u b s t a n t i a l reforms r a t h e r than an 
abolition to meet these concerns. On 17 
July 1985 the Employment Secre ta ry 
announced to the House of Commons that the 
Government proposed t o i n t r o d u c e 
l eg i s l a t ion in the parliamentary session 
which has just begun which would -
(1) remove a l l young people under 21 from 
any regulation by Wage Council 
(2) confine wage Councils to setting only 
a single minimum hourly ra te and a 
single overtime rate for those 21 and 
over. 
(3) simplify the procedures under which 
the Employment Secretary may modify or 
abolish individual Councils. 
In addition, the statement indicated that 
the Government had decided to deratify 
International Labour Convention No 26. 
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4. Evaluation of the proposals 
The Government's proposed reform of Wages 
Councils represents a compromise between 
those who advocated outright abolition and 
those such as the TUC, who favoured 
retention of the Councils in a form at 
l eas t as powerful as they are at present. 
Evaluation of the Government's proposals 
i s f ac i l i t a t ed by f i r s t considering the 
arguments for and against preservation of 
the status quo. 
(a) The case against the Wages Councils 
The major objection to Wages Councils i s 
that they interfere with the operation of 
the labour market in such a way as to 
reduce employment. There are two main 
mechanisms through which the Councils are 
argued to exert a contractionary effect on 
employment. F i r s t , by se t t ing a legal 
floor to wages, the Councils have the 
d i rec t effect of "pricing workers out of 
jobs" . Thus, the Chancellor in h i s 
budget speech this year argued that "Wages 
Councils destroy jobs by making i t i l legal 
for employers to offer work at wages they 
can afford and the unemployed are prepared 
to accept". Secondly, Wages Councils 
tend to "red-tape" workers out of jobs by 
subjecting often small firms to what can 
be very lengthy and complex o r d e r s , 
detailing minimal requirements on hours of 
work, holiday enti t lements and other 
aspects of the employment relation as well 
as s e t t i n g a whole range of minimum 
financial rewards for various categories 
of workers. Such r e d - t a p e , i t i s 
argued, inh ib i t s the development and 
growth of small firms by, in effect , 
increasing the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o s t s , 
broadly defined, which are associated with 
employment. 
The "pricing workers out of jobs" argument 
i s based on the notion that firms covered 
by any Council 's o rders opera te in 
commodity markets which are highly 
competitive and in labour markets which 
would be highly competitive if i t were not 
for the i n f l e x i b i l i t i e s imposed by the 
Wages Councils themselves . In such 
circumstances an effective minimum wage 
ra te forces the "real product wage" to be 
above t h a t which would p r eva i l in a 
competitive market. The real product 
wage - the money wage rate divided by the 
price of firms' output - measures the real 
cost of labour to firms. An effective 
minimum wage rate then raises this cost to 
firms, and under competitive assumptions, 
this will lead to a contraction in firms' 
demands for labour. 
The inverse re la t ion between the real 
product wage and the demand for labour in 
present c i rcumstances r e f l e c t s the 
operation of two adjustment mechanisms. 
F i r s t , the higher wage imposed by Wages 
Councils forces firms to increase the 
price of the i r output. This leads to a 
contraction in consumers' demands for that 
output and so to a reduction in firms' 
demands for labour. This output effect 
of a wage inc rease on employment i s 
reinforced by the substitution effect. 
This refers to the notion that as the real 
product wage increases firms are induced 
to subs t i tu te other, now cheaper, inputs 
for labour in the i r productive process. 
For example, firms might be induced to 
shift to a more capital intensive mode of 
production in an effort to mit igate the 
effects of the wage increase on costs and 
on profits. 
Abolition of the Wages Councils would, in 
these circumstances, permit wages to fall 
to their "equilibrium" level ie the level 
which, in a free market, equates the 
demand and supply of labour services. 
This would genera te a s t imulus to 
employment via both the output and 
substitution effects. Thus the reduction 
in wages would be expected to : reduce 
firms* prices and so stimulate consumer 
demand for t h e i r output and thereby 
increase firms' demands for labour; induce 
a subst i tu t ion effect away from other 
inputs and in favour of employment. 
These anticipated employment gains from 
a b o l i t i o n were e x p e c t e d t o be 
disproportionately favourable for young 
workers for two main reasons. F i r s t , 
although only about 5% of the Wages 
Council workforce are full-time employees 
under the age of 18, this represents about 
20? of a l l young people in employment. 
Works Council t r a d e s , e s p e c i a l l y in 
retailing and catering, have traditionally 
employed higher proportions of young 
people. Secondly, i t has been suggested 
that Wages Councils had the effect of 
raising youth workers' wages by a greater 
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proportional amount than adult wages, so 
r e d u c i n g t h e y o u t h - t o - a d u l t wage 
differential. Also, adult rates s tar t at 
comparatively early ages. (Thus: 16-
year olds were en t i t l ed to about 65% of 
adult minima; 17-year olds were entitled 
to about 702 of adult minima; in most 
Councils adult ra tes s t a r t at 18 and, in 
two of the largest, at 19). Abolition of 
the Councils would then be expected to 
g e n e r a t e p a r t i c u l a r l y f a v o u r a b l e 
substitution effects in favour of younger 
workers , who are d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y 
represented among the unemployed. 
The "red-tape" argument tends to reinforce 
the case for "pricing workers into jobs" 
by abolishing the Wages Councils. The 
wages orders can run to 30 pages in length 
and apply to many di f ferent types of 
workers; t h e i r p rov i s i ons are often 
complex and difficult to interpret. The 
C o u n c i l s c o n s e q u e n t l y impose a 
considerable bureaucratic burden on firms 
and so inhibit f lexibil i ty and efficiency. 
These arguments were thought to be 
par t i cu la r ly t e l l i ng in view of the fact 
t h a t t w o - t h i r d s of Wages Counci l 
e s t a b l i s h m e n t s employ l e s s than ten 
people. 
(b) Assessment of the case against the 
Wages Councils 
Clearly any employment reducing effects of 
Wages Councils a re dependent on the 
Councils having been effective in setting 
wages above the level that would otherwise 
have prevailed. On this point two issues 
are of i n t e r e s t : the extent of non-
compliance and the numbers of workers who 
receive only the minima la id down by the 
Wages Councils. 
Of the establishments visited by the Wages 
Council inspectorate, over 35% were found 
to be underpaying some workers. This 
very high proportion i s in part explicable 
in terms of the cri teria used to decide on 
whether a v is i t i s required. In fact, as 
has already been noted, in many of these 
cases only one or two workers were 
underpaid, and only 6% of the workers 
covered by checks were found to be 
underpaid. There is l i t t l e evidence then 
of wages orders simply being neglected by 
covered firms. 
The numbers of Wage Council employees who 
are actually paid the statutory minima has 
been i nc r ea s ing s ince 1974 and i s 
currently around 1 million workers. This 
suggests that at least for these 1 million 
employees wages are higher than they would 
be in the absence of Wages Councils. 
Furthermore, i t could well be that the 
minima exert a "ratchet effect" on the 
e n t i r e wage s t r u c t u r e within covered 
industr ies (and perhaps beyond) so that 
even those who are paid above the minima 
rece ive more than they would in the 
absence of Councils. Such an effect 
could ar i se i f firms or workers acted on 
the basis of conventional d i f f e ren t i a l s . 
However, a r a t c h e t e f f e c t would be 
inconsistent with the notion tha t Wages 
Counci ls ' coverage app l i e s to what 
otherwise would be highly competitive 
labour markets. 
In summary, i t seems that non-compliance 
with wages orders i s not quant i ta t ive ly 
very important, and that Wages Councils 
are responsible for increasing the wages 
of at leas t one mil l ion of the i r workers 
above what they would otherwise be. 
However, the low abso lu te l e v e l s of 
minimum adult fu l l - t ime ra tes may give 
r i s e to scepticism concerning the scope 
for s i g n i f i c a n t r educ t ions in wages 
following abolition of the Wages Councils. 
The social securi ty and tax transfer 
systems provide an effective floor to the 
l e v e l s of wages a t which i t pays 
individuals to become employed. On the 
other hand, given that four f i f ths of 
Wages Council workers are female and about 
t w o - t h i r d s work only p a r t - t i m e , the 
e f f e c t i v e f loor to wages in these 
industries provided by the social security 
sys tem may be very low indeed . 
Furthermore, if the demand for labour in 
these trades was highly responsive to wage 
changes, s ignif icant employment gains 
could be made even if the wage reductions 
which followed abolition were re la t ive ly 
sl ight. 
How responsive then i s the demand for 
labour to real wage changes? This i s an 
extremely difficult question to answer and 
one on which there is conflicting evidence 
and a wide d ivers i ty of opinion. There 
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i s not even general agreement on the 
l i k e l y d i r e c t i o n of the impact of 
effective minimum wages on employment. 
Wages Councils' upward stimulus to the 
real product wage could actually increase 
employment in at least two circumstances: 
where they cover industries which are non-
competitive in cer tain key respects in 
e i ther commodity or labour markets; and 
where Wages Councils actually have the 
effect of "shocking" firms into seeking 
more ef f ic ient methods of production (a 
phenomenon which i tself requires less than 
perfect competition in product markets). 
Consider, f i r s t , the importance of the 
assumed deg ree of l a b o u r marke t 
competition for the supposed disemployment 
effects of minimum wages. If firms have 
"market power" on the demand side of the 
labour market (ie if they have a degree 
of "monopsony" power), which can ar i se 
from labour i m m o b i l i t i e s , firms can 
increase their profits by employing fewer 
workers and at a lower wage than would be 
the case in a competitive labour market. 
In such circumstances labour would be 
"exploited" in the sense that a part of 
the contribution of labour to the value of 
output would be captured by firms in the 
form of higher p rof i t s . Wages Councils 
in such a context would const i tu te a 
"counter-veiling power", and as such could 
actually increase employment by increasing 
real wages over a range, and eliminating 
e x p l o i t a t i o n . I f a d e g r e e of 
monopsonistic power is prevalent in Wages 
Council industries, then their abol i t ion 
would indeed lower wages, but could also 
lower employment. Both these responses 
would be reflected in increased prof i t s 
going to employers in the previously 
covered sector. 
I t may appear at f i r s t sight that the 
monopsony power argument can hardly be 
applicable in the present case since, as 
we have already noted, some two-thirds of 
Wages Council establishments employ less 
than ten people. In fact, however, the 
distribution of covered employment across 
establ ishments i s a highly misleading 
indicator of market s t ructure in the 
present context. The r e t a i l t rade, the 
hotel industry and the licensed trade 
which jointly employ over 2 million of 2.7 
m i l l i o n covered workers , tend to be 
dominated by large and, in some cases, 
giant f i n i s (such as Marks and Spencer, 
John Lewis and Boots). Such firms employ 
the vast majority of workers in the retail 
t r ade and account for the bulk of 
turnover. A recent market survey on the 
grocery trade found that in 1982 about 80% 
of turnover went through only 20% of a l l 
o u t l e t s owned by j u s t 0.3? of the 
businesses concerned. (Source: IDS 
Report 448, May 1985, p1). 
The poss ib i l i ty that some firms, who are 
impor tan t employers in the se rv ice 
i n d u s t r i e s af fec ted by Wages Council 
orders, are in a position to exert a 
degree of monopsony power cannot readily 
be discounted (although the i r importance 
in the product market i s cer tainly no 
guarantee of th i s ) . Elimination of the 
Wages Councils would c r e a t e g r ea t e r 
potential for the exploitation of current 
Wages Council employees, which could have 
the effect of increasing prof i t s and 
perhaps even decreasing employment. 
Imperfect competition in the product 
market, notably in the form of pr ice-
se t t ing behaviour by firms, offers a 
possible source of insensitivity of firms' 
demands for labour services to the real 
wage. For if prices are set on a simple 
"cost-plus" basis (for which there i s some 
evidence), firms' sales become physically 
constrained by consumers' demands for 
the i r products. In such circumstances 
the output effect of a decrease in the 
real product wage wi l l be inoperative: 
firms cannot se l l a l l they would wish at 
prevailing real wages, so that there is no 
i ncen t i ve to take on more labour to 
produce more output (which the firm cannot 
s e l l ) . Technology permitting, over the 
longer-term a subst i tut ion effect would 
s t i l l be operative, but clearly the real 
wage responsiveness of the demand for 
labour would be much less than in the 
compet i t ive commodity market case . 
Furthermore, i t is likely that by far the 
most important determinant of employment 
in such circumstances would be the level 
of effective demand in the commodity 
market. Given s a l e s c o n s t r a i n t s on 
firms, the employment creating effects of 
a Wages-Council-abolition-induced real 
wage reduc t ion i s l i k e l y to be very 
limited, and probably would be a long time 
in coming. The only really effective and 
immediate means of stimulating employment 
in the assumed conditions would be an 
expansion in the effective demand for 
commodities (of the sort that would result 
from Keynesian demand-management 
policies). 
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The shock effect argument presumes tha t , 
in the absence of Wages Councils, at least 
some firms in the relevant service sectors 
are generally characterised by rather 
slack management practices. The increase 
in the wage which accompanies Wages 
Council formation "shocks" firms into more 
e f f i c i e n t management p r a c t i c e s with 
respect to labour uti l isation, investment 
p o l i c i e s and a d a p t i v e n e s s to new 
technology. This e f f e c t could so 
predominate that employment could increase 
as a r e su l t . (Note that the presumed 
advantageous response i s quite d i s t i nc t 
from the conventional analysis of the 
effects of a wage increase outlined in the 
preceding section of the paper. The 
adoption of more c a p i t a l i n t e n s i v e 
techniques in that context represents a 
"damage-limitation" strategy associated 
with what can generally be regarded as a 
degree of "over-investment".) Perhaps 
the converse argument applied to Wages 
Council abolition is less persuasive since 
i t requires tha t management a c t u a l l y 
becomes less efficient. The idea here is 
that management a t ten t ion would become 
focussed on the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of wage-
cut t ing, rather than on, for example, 
investment strategies etc. 
The Government would no doubt argue that 
such sources of limited, or even perverse, 
real wage sensitivity of labour demand are 
of l i t t l e more than theoretical interest. 
In the longer-term especia l ly , labour 
would be regarded as sufficiently mobile 
and labour market competition sufficiently 
effective to preclude the exercise of 
monopsony power; the p r o f i t motive 
combined with competitive pressures would 
be regarded as el iminating the scope for 
shock effects and for "irrational" product 
pricing policies which give rise to sales 
constraints. Nevertheless, the available 
evidence by no means offers unequivocal 
support for these arguments. 
I t should perhaps be acknowledged at this 
stage that the arguments considered so far 
by no means cons t i tu te a comprehensive 
account of possible responses to Wages 
Council abolition (or reform). Thus, no 
exp l i c i t consideration has been given to 
the possible longer-term consequences 
involving i n t e r - s e c t o r a l mobility of 
capital. However, suitable extension of 
the a n a l y s i s would , in our v i ew, 
considerably complicate matters without 
adding anything of other than second-order 
importance to the i s sues of cu r r en t 
concern. Similarly a full evaluation of 
avai lable empirical evidence i s outwith 
t h e scope of t he p r e s e n t p a p e r . 
Consequently, we simply provide a brief 
discussion intended to give a flavour of 
the evidence, and the problems to which 
i t s interpretation i s subject. 
One source of evidence, emphasised in the 
consultat ive paper on Wages Councils, i s 
the recent review of the wage-employment 
re la t ion published by the Treasury (HMT, 
1985). Whilst t h i s review suggests a 
fa i r ly strong inverse re la t ion between 
wages and employment, i t s conclusions and 
interpretation are open to dispute. (As, 
for example, in an ar t icle by Bell, Holden 
and McGregor in the May issue of t h i s 
Commentary). In particular, much of the 
beneficial effect of "wage r e s t r a in t " in 
the Treasury ' s own simulat ions arose 
through the supposed stimulus to aggregate 
e f f e c t i v e demand consequent upon the 
impact of genera l wage and p r i ce 
" d e f l a t i o n " , r a t h e r than through any 
reduction in the real product wage. I t 
i s f a i r to note, however, that a growing 
number of fairly aggregate studies, based 
on competitive assumptions, have tended to 
find evidence of a s ignif icant negative 
influence of real wages on employment. 
One problem with t he se aggrega t ive 
econometric studies, as well as with those 
which are more m i c r o - o r i e n t a t e d and 
directed more specif ical ly at the Wages 
Council sectors , i s tha t they tend not to 
be expl ic i t ly directed at the crucial 
issue: discrimination among competing 
visions of the degree of competition in 
product and labour markets. A recent 
econometric study of the impact of wages 
floors in the clothing industry (Morgan, 
Paterson and Barrie , 1985) found that 
models based on non-competitive labour 
markets outperformed the a l t e rna t ive . 
Under the assumption t h a t p r i c e s in 
product markets did not adjust so as to 
continuously "clear" (ie equate demand 
and supply in) product markets, they 
estimated that roughly 10% of the decline 
in the clothing industry's male employment 
over the period 195V6 to 1977/9 was 
a t t r i b u t a b l e to r e a l minimum wages. 
Under c o m p e t i t i v e p r o d u c t marke t 
assumptions (which, r eca l l , permit an 
output as well as a subst i tu t ion effect) 
t h i s e s t i m a t e r o s e t o 20%. 
Notwithstanding the professionalism of the 
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study, i t s f i n d i n g s , l i k e those of 
v i r t u a l l y any appl ied econometr ic 
exercise, must be subject to a plethora of 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s . For example, i t i s 
extremely d i f f i c u l t to success fu l ly 
isolate the impact of minimum wages per se 
in a world in which so many f a c t o r s 
r e l evan t to employment have changed. 
Also many relevant variables are subject 
to horrendous measurement problems, 
n o t a b l y f i r m s ' and i n d i v i d u a l s ' 
e x p e c t a t i o n s , adjustment c o s t s , the 
capital stock and fixed employment costs. 
Furthermore, some a l t e r n a t i v e model 
formulations (eg monopsony) are not 
considered, and notionally confl ict ing 
models are not forced to compete on a 
proper s ta t is t ica l basis. For these and 
a host of other reasons the estimates 
which r e s u l t from t h i s e x e r c i s e are 
extremely speculative. 
An a l t e r n a t i v e approach involves a 
questionnaire and interview-based analysis 
of Wages Council employers and employees. 
A recent example of a comprehensive study 
of t h i s type i s the Craig and Wilkinson 
(1985) analysis of four r e t a i l t rades , 
which suggested tha t the relevant Wages 
Councils had not had an important 
i n d e p e n d e n t e m p l o y m e n t e f f e c t . 
Furthermore, the authors considered that 
the evidence favoured the existence of 
"shock" type effects of Wages Councils, 
and that they provided an important, 
stable wage-fixing s t ructure . However, 
this approach is subject to i t s own set of 
difficulties, notably the possibility that 
firms behave in a rather different fashion 
from that which they actually describe 
(and perhaps perceive). For example, 
free-market oriented economists would 
emphasise the l ink between the "s ta te of 
trade" which was emphasised as a key 
determinant of employment - and the wage 
paid to labour, through i t s impact on 
pricing behaviour, which was apparently 
not so regarded by firms. 
Given the problems which, i t has already 
been noted, are attendant on any attempt 
to i so la te the Wages Council-employment 
re la t ion for a l l workers, i t should be 
unsurprising that identical problems beset 
invest igation of the Councils' impact on 
youth employment. There does exis t , 
however, some evidence which suggests an 
inverse re la t ion between the youth-adult 
d i f fe rent ia l and youth employment (see 
Wells, 1983). 
Some attempts have been made to estimate 
the l ikely overall effects on employment 
of a b o l i t i o n of a l l Wages Councils . 
These have a l l suggested a p o s i t i v e 
stimulus to employment ranging from 8,000 
(Low Pay Unit), through 70,000 (Metcalfe), 
up to 300,000 (Minford). The differences 
reflect conflicting judgements on a whole 
range of issues relevant to the real wage 
responsiveness of employment - a not-
unexpected state of affairs in view of the 
preceding discussion. 
Finally, i t may be worth noting tha t the 
impact on registered unemployment i s 
l i k e l y to be far l e s s than t h a t on 
employment (irrespective of the direction 
of the e f f e c t ) s ince Wages Council 
employees tend to be concentrated among 
( p a r t - t i m e ) female workers who are 
particularly prone to "non-participation" 
rather than to registered unemployment. 
Overall, the case against Wages Councils 
on the basis that they price s ignif icant 
numbers of workers out of jobs must be 
judged to be not proven, notwithstanding 
the Government's claims to the contrary. 
What of the argument that the Councils' 
"red-tape" workers out of jobs? This 
argument seemed par t icular ly t e l l ing in 
view of the large numbers of Wages Council 
e s t ab l i shmen t s with l e s s than ten 
employees, but as has already been noted, 
this gives a rather misleading picture of 
market s t ruc ture in covered indust r ies . 
The addit ional induced administrat ive 
burden per employee in large firms i s 
l ikely to be negligible. Also, there i s 
some evidence that small firms do not 
wide ly r e g a r d g e n e r a l employment 
legislation as a major burden (Clifton and 
Tatton-Brown, 1979), and that some firms, 
at l ea s t , regard Wages Councils as a 
useful forum which s u b s t i t u t e s for 
col lec t ive bargaining in establ ishing 
conventional wage-fixing arrangements and 
ensuring "orderliness" in labour market 
behaviour (whilst avoiding what some firms 
would regard as the additional costs of 
unionisation). There seems l i t t l e doubt, 
however, that the often long and complex 
wage orders could inhibi t employment 
growth in small firms. 
Finally, i t should be noted that wages 
c o n s t i t u t e by far the major p a r t of 
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households' incomes. Abolition of Wages 
Councils would c e r t a i n l y genera te a 
reduction in the incomes of those workers 
c u r r e n t l y employed in Wages Council 
industries - workers who are already among 
the very lowest paid. Whatever the 
Government would wish, notions of equity, 
farness and morality abound in the wage 
fixing process (often among firms as well 
as workers). Such considerations would 
lead some to oppose the abolition of Wages 
Councils even i f the employment creating 
effects of this change could be proven. 
The response to the "equity case" for 
Councils i s t h r e e - f o l d . F i r s t , the 
composition of employment i s such that i t 
i s l ike ly that many covered workers are 
not the main earners in the households of 
which they are a par t . Secondly, if the 
demand for labour i s quite responsive to 
real wage changes, tota l labour incomes 
could actual ly increase as a consequence 
of abol i t ion. In any event, those who 
would f i l l the newly created jobs need to 
be c o n s i d e r e d in any concep t of 
" f a i r n e s s " . T h i r d l y , and more 
fundamentally, these notions, however 
w e l l - i n t e n t i o n e d , a re misplaced and 
interfere with the efficient operation of 
labour markets. Better to resolve income 
d i s t r ibu t ion problems through the tax-
t r a n s f e r s y s t e m , and l e a v e p r i c e 
determination and resource al locat ion to 
the free markets. 
The reader w i l l note that the second and 
third of these counter-arguments involve 
implicit assumptions about the competitive 
nature of both product and labour markets 
in the absence of Wages Counci ls . 
Furthermore, the third argument presumes 
both that a tax t ransfer reform could be 
devised t h a t compensated the poorer 
households (yet had a lesser disincentive 
e f f e c t on employment) and t h a t the 
Government would be committed to the 
implementation of such a reform. 
5. Assessment of the Government's 
proposed reforms 
The Government's proposals exhibit a 
number of asymmetries in the i r implied 
response to the arguments considered in 
previous sect ions . Thus, adults (now 
defined as 21 and over) continue to be 
subject to minimum wage and overtime 
premium regulations (albeit in terms of a 
s ingle ra te in each case), yet non-wage 
regulations are to be abolished for adults 
and youths are no longer to be covered by 
Wages Councils at a l l . 
The retention of the Council's wage minima 
for adult workers seems curious when 
juxtaposed a g a i n s t the Government's 
continued exhortations for workers to 
"price themselves into jobs". Perhaps i t 
r e f l ec t s some concern about "employer 
power" in the covered industries; but this 
ra i ses the question of why adults need 
wage "protection" although they do not 
need protection on non-wage benefits and 
why young workers apparently need no 
protection whatsoever. 
Alternatively, perhaps retention of adult 
minima reflects acceptance of an element 
of the "shock" e f f ec t or s t a b i l i t y 
enhancing propert ies of Wages Councils. 
But again i t i s not c l e a r why these 
considerations do not apply equally to 
non-wage benefits and to youth workers. 
In fact, elimination of non-wage benefits 
from the Wages Councils control seems 
l ike ly to r e su l t in some reduction in 
these b e n e f i t s in a t l e a s t p a r t i a l 
compensation for the impact of wage minima 
on the to ta l price of labour services to 
covered firms. Thus, a given minimum 
wage, a f t e r reform, i s l i k e l y to be 
associated with a lower to t a l cost of 
labour services than i s currently the 
case. Whether t h i s r esu l t s in lesser 
disemployment effects or simply higher 
prof i t s depends to a large degree on the 
extent of competition in product and 
factor markets. 
On the treatment of young workers i t could 
be that the balance of arguments was held 
to be more persuasively in favour of 
abolition: there had been some suggestion 
of a disproportionately adverse effect of 
Wages Councils on youth employment; the 
freeing of youth wages alone would be 
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unlikely to create disorder in labour 
markets generally (given the i r r e l a t ive 
lack of importance in terms of t o t a l 
employment in covered indust r ies) ; any 
disadvantageous d i s t r i b u t i o n a l e f f ec t 
would be far l e ss l ike ly to be widely 
regarded as unacceptable since very many 
of those affected are unlikely to be main 
breadwinners. 
However, any disproportionate employment 
effect which existed could have been 
e l imina ted by r e s t r i c t i n g the youth 
d i f f e r e n t i a l in covered indust r ies to 
whatever was fel t to be a more appropriate 
level (perhaps based on d i f fe ren t i a l s in 
uncovered sectors) . By controll ing the 
wages of adult workers and freeing those 
of youth workers the Government has not 
simply eliminated what i t perceived to be 
a "distortion" - i t has created a new one, 
operating in the opposi te d i r e c t i o n . 
Firms will be induced to substitute youth 
for adult workers and, to the extent that 
other employment legislation permits, to 
encourage turnover of young employees 
approaching 21. Furthermore, if many 
young workers are as productive as the i r 
adult counterparts (and firms have a 
degree of market power) exploi tat ion of 
younger workers and increased prof i t s 
could resul t . 
The proposed reforms radical ly diminish 
the "red-tape" assoc ia ted wi th Wages 
Council operations, since they permit the 
se t t ing of only one wage minimum and one 
overtime minimum ra te , and since only 
adults are covered and non-wage benefits 
are excluded from consideration. Litt le 
additional complexity would have arisen 
from s e t t i n g minimal cond i t ions for 
certain non-wage benefits such as holiday 
pay entitlement. 
Overall, the s implif icat ion afforded by 
the proposed reforms of the Wages Council 
system i s l ike ly to be widely welcomed, 
although many will consider this aspect of 
reform to have been taken too fa r . 
However, the influential Monetarist wing 
within the Government will undoubtedly be 
disappointed a t the decision to reform 
rather than abolish the Councils, and feel 
d i s t i n c t l y uncomfor table w i t h t he 
incons i s tency implied by Government 
e x h o r t a t i o n s for workers to p r i ce 
themselves into jobs whilst adult workers 
in Wages Council indust r ies are legal ly 
prevented from doing so. Those more 
s c e p t i c a l of the e f f ec t i venes s of 
competitive pressures in commodity and 
labour markets, and concerned for the 
likely impact on the incomes of those who 
are already on extremely low pay, will be 
relieved a t the retention of the Wages 
C o u n c i l s , bu t a p p r e h e n s i v e t h a t 
restricting their scope to cover only wage 
b e n e f i t s paid to adu l t workers w i l l 
increase the potential for exploitation of 
the weak in the labour market. For the 
sceptics, inconsistency in the application 
of what they regard as misconceived 
policies i s to be welcomed. 
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